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Economics and criminal law have long been viewed as odd partners.  Economics stresses 
rationality, and has been referred to at times as the science or study of rational choice.1  Criminal 
law, by contrast, often applies to subjects who do not appear to behave rationally.2  Criminals are 
thought to behave impulsively and there is even genetic evidence suggesting a tendency toward 
impulsiveness among convicted violent criminals.3  One recent study suggests that the 
propensity toward criminality is strongly related to one’s psychological ability to postpone 
gratification, an ability that appears to be formed early in life.4 
People who are suspicious about the application of economics, or more generally a “rational 
incentives framework,” to crime probably would fear that such a framework would generate 
ineffective punishments by doing a poor job of taking into account the weak link between 
rationality and the behavior of criminals.5  One possible shortcoming is that the rationality model 
might lead to the imposition of outrageous punishments, such as those proposed by Bentham,6 to 
make sure that the punishment system catches the attention of potential criminals.  Alternatively, 
the rationality framework might generate harsh punishments to make up for the risk of non-
detection of criminal activity.7  Another possible distortion, in the opposite direction, is that a 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (3d ed. 1986). 
2 On the reasons for this perception, see Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and Crimes: 
Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 149, 149-50 (1991); Alon Harel, Behavioural 
Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey, 2 BERGEN J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 32, 34-35 (2014); Rebecca Hollander-
Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of Self-Control, 61 EMORY L.J. 501, 504-05 (2012); Richard H. 
McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics, in 3 CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 
413-26 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
3 On genetics and criminal behavior, see, e.g., Andy Coghlan, ‘Impulsivity Gene’ Found in Violent Offenders, NEW 
SCIENTIST (Dec. 23, 2010), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19903-impulsivity-gene-found-in-violent-
offenders/; Genes and Behavior: Next Candidate, ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21629223-more-evidence-certain-versions-some-genes-
can-encourage-violence-next; Adrian Rain, The Criminal Mind: Advances in Genetics and Neuroscience are 
Revolutionizing our Understanding of Violent Behavior, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2013, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323335404578444682892520530.  
4 See Robert M. Sapolsky, A Criminal Trait in the Refusal to Wait?: ‘Time Discounting’ by Children may Predict 
Trouble Ahead, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-criminal-trait-in-the-refusal-to-wait-
1478107218 (finding highest probability of future criminal behavior in children who cannot wait to receive a 
marshmallow). 
5 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 178-82 (2004).  
6 On Bentham’s unusual and perhaps outrageous punishments, see JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF 
PUNISHMENT 60-61 (Richard Smith ed. & trans., London, R. Heward 1830). 
7 A long-standing policy in the deterrence literature is that fines or damages should be multiplied by the inverse of 
the probability of detection to prevent deterrence from being diluted by the likelihood of non-detection.  For 
discussion of this policy, see Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 388, 388-91 (2005).  The inverse probability multiplier policy lends support to harsh punishments for 
crimes that are difficult to detect.  Gary Becker, in his seminal economic analysis of punishment, noted that his 
economic model offered a positive account for harsh punishments used in the past, when enforcement capabilities 
were limited.  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 184 
(1968) (“There was a tendency during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Anglo-Saxon countries, and even 
today in many Communist and underdeveloped countries, to punish those convicted of criminal offenses rather 
severely, at the same time that the probability of capture and conviction was set at rather low values. A promising 
explanation of this tendency is that an increased probability of conviction obviously absorbs public and 
private resources in the form of more policemen, judges, juries, and so forth.”).  Because of this aspect of his article, 
Becker’s policy has sometimes been compared to a “boil him in oil” approach to enforcement. See Alon Harel, 
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rationality framework might counsel in favor of weak punishments, or no punishments at all, on 
the theory that it makes no sense to punish a criminal after the crime has been committed, 
because the crime is a sunk cost in relation to society’s welfare after it has occurred.8    
This essay sets out a comprehensive account of rational punishment theory and spells out its 
implications for criminal law reform.  Specifically, what offenses should be subjected to criminal 
punishment, and how should we punish?  Should we use prison sentences or fines, and where 
should we use them?  Should some conduct be left to a form of market punishment through 
private lawsuits?  Should fines be used to fund the criminal justice system?9 
The answers I offer address some of the most important public policy issues of the moment, such 
as mass incarceration and the use of fines to finance law enforcement.  The Department of 
Justice, in its report on Ferguson, Missouri, concluded that the unfair use of fines as a method of 
financing the local criminal justice system violated civil right laws,10 in addition to giving rise to 
anti-police protests during 2015.11  The issues are broader, however, than reflected in the current 
unrest over criminal law enforcement.  In antitrust, a topic that generates few if any street 
protests, there is a current problem of multiple punishments and even multiple prison sentences 
                                                 
Criminal Law as an Efficiency-Enhancing Device: The Contribution of Gary Becker, in FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS IN 
MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 297, 308 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014).  
8 To elaborate, if there were no deterrent effect from punishment, it would be irrational to punish.  This is connected 
to the reasoning of the chain store paradox.  Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 
131-32 (1978).  On the last day of earth, according to the paradox, it would be irrational to punish because there 
could not be a deterrent effect.  Reasoning backward, it would not make sense to punish the day before the last day, 
and the day before that, and so on.  Showing an awareness of this paradox, and rejecting utilitarianism as an 
approach to punishment, Immanuel Kant argued that on the last day of earth, the last murderer sitting in prison 
should be executed: 
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its members (e.g., if a people 
inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the world), the last murderer 
remaining in the prison would first have to be executed, so that each has done to him what his 
deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this 
punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation of 
justice. 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) 
(1797).  
9 On fees imposed to finance the criminal justice system, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 154-55 (2010) (describing the recent practice of charging newly 
released prisoners the wide-ranging costs associated with their incarceration); Developments in the Law—Policing, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1727-33 (2015) [hereinafter Developments] (listing usage fees, for-profit probation 
supervision, and civil forfeiture among the various mechanisms used to finance the criminal justice system). 
10 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 15 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.  
11 Id. at 27; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Findings of Two Civil 




imposed on firms and employees who violate the competition laws.12  Presently there are calls to 
bring some rationality and coordination to global antitrust enforcement.13   
The problems at the heart of the current unrest over criminal law enforcement and concerns 
raised in antitrust require a reexamination of some of the same fundamental issues.  A reform 
plan should be broad enough to address both sets of complaints.  However, a reexamination of 
fundamental issues requires a theoretical framework capable of addressing such issues.  My aim 
is to offer such a framework, mainly by unifying some disparate approaches that already exist in 
the literature.  The framework of this paper is firmly grounded in rational deterrence policy, and 
yet points toward reforms that would soften or reduce the scope of criminal punishment.  
Specifically, the suggested reforms would oust criminal law from the regulation of many market 
exchanges (e.g., marijuana sales), sharply limit the use of prison as a form of punishment, and 
place stringent conditions on the use of fines to finance law enforcement. 
This paper’s framework integrates the standard model of rational criminal deterrence, which had 
its first flowering in 1764 through the work of Beccaria,14 and with public choice theory,15 which 
emphasizes the incentives of enforcement agents.16  The standard model on its own implies 
optimal limits, often overlooked, for the scope of criminal law enforcement.  Part of the 
contribution of this paper’s framework is in identifying optimal scope limitations implied by 
standard deterrence theory.  Public choice theory reinforces and adds to these limitations, helps 
explain anomalous features of law enforcement (such as the occasional hobbling of enforcement 
agents by corruption), and offers reasons for policing the optimal scope limitations to ensure that 
self-interested enforcement agents do not push the scope of criminal law beyond its optimal 
boundaries. 
One of the goals of the rational incentives framework is to take criminal law policy-theorizing 
away from arguments that point to the essential nature of the offender, an argument that easily 
drifts into theories of genetic or cultural determinism.  Such theories are often unhelpful as 
guides to state policy, especially in the area of criminal law.  The rational incentives framework 
views criminals and non-criminals as essentially the same, and controlled by the same incentives 
to seek advantage for themselves.  It is the goal of the state first to ensure that the incentives set 
up by the offender’s environment, including the law, do not encourage socially undesirable 
                                                 
12 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001); John Terzaken & Pieter 
Huizing, How Much is Too Much? A Call for Global Principles to Guide the Punishment of International Cartels, 
27 ANTITRUST MAG. 53, 53 (2013); Spencer W. Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI-KENT 
L. REV. 207, 207-08 (2003). 
13 See, e.g., Terzaken & Huizing, supra note 13. 
14 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 43 (Henry Paolucci ed., Prentice Hall 1963) (1764).  
15 For a survey of public choice theory by one of its founders, see Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in 6 STEVEN N. 
DURLAUF & LAWRENCE E. BLUME, THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 722-27 (2d ed. 2008).  One 
aspect of public choice theory, rent-seeking, is core to this analysis.  The rent-seeking literature is thought to have 
originated with Gordon Tullock. Gorden Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 WESTERN 
ECON. J. 224, 231-32 (1967). 
16 Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 61, 72-78 (2007). 
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behavior. In every instance where such behavior is observed, this framework starts with the 
presumption that it can be attributed to rational incentives. 
Rational Deterrence Policy and Crime 
The rational model of punishment has been around for quite a long time.17  I will make no effort 
here to rehash the theory in detail.  Instead, I will briefly review the theory and move directly 
into its application. 
The rational incentives framework began with Beccaria and Bentham and stressed the 
elimination of the prospect of gain to the criminal.18  While this is not a surprising proposition, 
their arguments began a revolution in thinking on criminal law enforcement.  Beccaria single-
handedly introduced Enlightenment thinking into law enforcement policy.  Like other 
Enlightenment thinkers, Beccaria dispensed with notions that normative judgments should be 
determined by tradition or references to what seemed appropriate based on the Old Testament.  
He replaced this traditional mode of thinking, in the area of criminal law jurisprudence, with a 
rational incentives model that posited that the purpose of punishment is to deter crime.  
Punishment should therefore aim to take the gain out of crime, but not more than the level 
required to eliminate the gain.19  Harsher punishments, in Beccaria’s view, worsened crime by 
inducing correspondingly harsh views on the part of the public and of potential criminals too.20 
The mechanism by which harsh punishments would coarsen criminals was not clear in 
Beccaria’s account.  Beccaria suggested that harsh punishments reflected a set of unforgiving 
norms adopted within society, and that those norms infected the punished as much as the 
punishers.  Under this theory, criminals, seeing that they would be dealt with harshly, would find 
no reason to be lenient toward their victims.  Each victim, in a sense, represented the state that 
promised to torture them, and therefore could be treated badly as a matter of reciprocal dealing.  
Punishment, in Beccaria’s framework, therefore included a component that sought to educate the 
punished and to inculcate a type of civic virtue. 
Bentham continued with Beccaria’s project but merged it with a theory of preferences and a 
sharper focus on incentives.  Bentham gave more thought to the types of punishment necessary 
to eliminate the prospect of gain.21  For example, given the impulsiveness and low rationality of 
criminals, Bentham thought it important to have punishments that were “characteristic” of the 
crime itself – so that a rapist, for example, would face the prospect of castration, or a thief the 
prospect of having his hands cut off.22  Bentham also introduced the theory of marginal 
                                                 
17 For a brief history, see Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO L. J. 
421, 425-27 (1998). 
18 See, e.g., BECCARIA, supra note 15; JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 166 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press 1996) (1789). 
19 Hylton, supra note 17, at 425-26. 
20 See BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 43-44. 
21 Hylton, supra note 18, at 426-27.  
22 See BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 76-93 (suggesting deformation and mutilation as possible punishments); id. at 60-
61 (suggesting punishment of the "offending member"-e.g.-"[i]n punishing the crime of forgery the hand of the 
offender may be transfixed by an iron instrument fashioned like a pen"). 
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deterrence as a justification for moderating punishments.23  Under this theory, punishments 
should be moderated to the level necessary to eliminate the gain, because otherwise the 
punishment itself could induce more destructive behavior.  For example, if the punishment for 
purse snatching and murder were the same (execution), a purse snatcher who believed that he 
would be executed would choose to murder his victim to make it easier to take the purse.  The 
marginal deterrence theory offered an alternative to Beccaria’s comparatively fuzzy educational 
theory of punishment, and one that generated specific implications for the level of punishment. 
This classical deterrence model has been at the core of rational punishment theory since the 
contributions of Beccaria and Bentham.  By focusing on gain elimination, both theorists 
indicated that punishment authorities should attempt to individualize punishments to the 
characteristics of the offender.  Both indicated that punishments should be more severe as the 
probability of detection declined.  Both indicated that punishment should be more severe as the 
distance in time between offense (receipt of gain to the offender) and punishment increased.  The 
differences were in fuzzier areas.  Bentham stressed the psychology of offenders in the 
determination of an appropriate punishment.  Beccaria stressed the educational function of 
punishment, and its concomitant need to uphold social norms of individual respect and mercy in 
operation. 
The Classical Deterrence Theory of Beccaria and Bentham remains influential today.  The major 
modern innovation in rational punishment thinking was Becker’s theory of punishment in 
1968.24  Becker argued that the goal of punishment should be to internalize the social costs of 
criminal activity rather than to eliminate the gains.  The reasons for switching to the 
internalization goal are several.  Most importantly, the criminal justice system has expanded 
beyond common law crimes (e.g., murder, mayhem, rape, battery, burglary, theft)25 to 
encompass many activities that are business practices and types of market exchange (e.g., drug 
selling).  For such activities, according to Becker, internalization is the proper goal to seek in 
order to maximize social welfare.  For activities that generally enhance society’s welfare – that 
is, where the gains to society generally exceed the losses to victims – internalization would shift 
the losses to the source of the activity, and appropriately discourage the activity without 
necessarily shutting it down.  For example, making a railroad pay for the losses imposed on 
victims of rail accidents would discourage some rail service while at the same time permitting it 
to continue where the benefits, as reflected by profits, were greater than the harms.  The second 
reason to prefer internalization is that it works just as well as gain elimination wherever the latter 
goal would be preferable.  Again, suppose railroads were inefficient, in the sense that the gains to 
society were less than the accident losses imposed on victims.  Under internalization, rail service 
                                                 
23 See BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 168 (asserting that "[w]here two offences come in competition, the punishment for 
the greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less."). For a more recent discussion on marginal 
deterrence theory, see generally George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970) 
(discussing the most recent updates on the marginal deterrence theory).  
24 Becker, supra note 7, at 169-70. 
25 On common law crimes generally, see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 176-
19 (Univ. Chi. Press 1976) (1768).  
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would be forced to shut down since the losses internalized would wipe out the profits of the 
railroads. 
Becker’s internalization approach implies, consistent with the Classical model, that the severity 
of punishment should vary inversely with the probability of detection.  Thus, crimes that are 
unlikely to be detected should be punished more harshly, other things being equal.  Becker’s 
analysis implies, under certain conditions, that the ideal penalty can be determined by dividing 
the social loss due to the crime by the probability of detection.26  The costs of enforcement can 
be minimized by reducing the amount of resources put into enforcement, thus lowering the 
probability of detection, and increasing the penalty.  In stark terms, the Becker model implies 
that an optimal enforcement system might consist of a single enforcement agent who, unable to 
capture the vast majority of offenders, makes up for the shortfall in volume by imposing an 
extremely harsh penalty on each offender he catches.  However, such a system would also have 
to incorporate marginal deterrence concerns to avoid encouraging criminals to choose the most 
harmful method of carrying out their crimes – that is, from making the crime fit the 
punishment.27 
Minimizing enforcement costs also provides the reason why imprisonment generally would not 
be the preferred method of punishment under the Becker model.  Imprisonment is an especially 
costly form of punishment, and forfeits the labor of the convicted criminal while he serves his 
sentence.  Resources could be saved by reducing the length of the sentence, or eliminating 
incarceration, and substituting a monetary penalty, or some other deterrent such as a system of 
probation and monitoring. 
Speed and efficiency are prized under the internalization model.  As long as social losses are 
internalized, there would be no apparent need to impose obstacles such as a high burden of proof 
for law enforcers.  Since the goal of internalization is not to completely deter a particularly 
malicious activity, discovering the intentions of the offender is not important.  There is no need 
to set up procedural obstacles for the purpose of separating the genuinely vicious from the 
merely awkward.  Such obstacles would only increase the cost of enforcement without enhancing 
the accuracy of the enforcement system. 
Neoclassical Deterrence Theory  
An important step toward reconciling these alternative rational punishment frameworks was 
taken by Calabresi and Melamed,28 and later by Posner.29  In the Calabresi-Melamed-Posner 
framework, the gain elimination policy is ideal wherever the burden of transacting is low, so that 
the potential victim and the potential criminal could bargain over the transfer of some entitlement 
                                                 
26 On the use of fines as punishment against risk-neutral agents, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON. 133, 133-34 (1992) 
(determining the optimal fines to punish risk-neutral agents for committing harms by factoring in the chance of not 
being detected).  
27 On the marginal deterrence theory as an accompaniment to Becker’s theory, see Stigler, supra note 23.  
28 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093-98 (1972). 
29 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985). 
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from the victim to the offender.  Thus, if a criminal wishes to gain ownership of the victim’s car, 
the criminal could simply negotiate over the purchase with the victim.  Where the burden of 
transacting is high, and the underlying transfer potentially welfare enhancing, then the loss 
internalization approach is preferable under this hybrid model, because it optimally regulates 
transfers by disincentivizing any transfer where the gain is less than the loss.  Since this 
framework reconciles the Classical deterrence model with Becker, it may appropriately be 
referred to as the Neoclassical Deterrence Model. 
As a positive theory of the common law, the Neoclassical model is far superior to either the 
complete deterrence (Beccaria, Bentham) or internalization (Becker) frameworks.  Viewing tort 
law as a system of punishment, it clearly does not seek, as a general matter, to eliminate the 
entire gain from activities that generate torts.30  If it did so, it would have shuttered many 
businesses such as railroads.  Tort liability seeks instead to internalize losses.  Adopting tort 
liability for accidents on the roads is consistent with the Neoclassical model because the 
underlying activities are socially beneficial and transaction costs prevent potential injurers and 
victims from allocating risks in advance.  Criminal law, by contrast, appears to have complete 
deterrence as its goal, and this is also consistent with the Neoclassical model.  The underlying 
activities are often not socially beneficial (such as robbery) and the offenses are often takings 
that in theory could have been arranged through a market transaction.31 
The Neoclassical model suggests that internalization should be left to the tort system and 
complete deterrence to the criminal justice system.32  There are many reasons to believe that the 
tort system is a comparatively superior system for internalization.  First, the tort system has an 
advantage in motivating enforcers: it enables victims to sue for losses, and one cannot be sure 
that public agents working in the criminal justice system will be equally motivated to internalize 
the losses of victims.  Second, the tort system has an advantage in the proof of loss: it enables 
victims to use their own private information about their losses to prove the magnitude of loss in 
each instance.  The public agents employed by the criminal justice system have no special 
information on the losses suffered by victims.  Third, the criminal justice system is geared 
primarily toward prohibition and preemption and uses all of the machinery necessary for these 
ends.  The process of apprehension and prosecution (including evidence gathering) is consistent 
with the general goal of preemption because it seeks to stop harms before they occur and to use 
extraordinary means to apprehend offenders.  Offenders apprehended under the criminal justice 
system are sometimes apprehended before the offense occurs and subjected to harsh and 
intrusive discovery methods.  Such an approach would be inappropriate when the state’s goal is 
merely to internalize rather than preempt losses.  Fourth, criminal law enforcement inevitably 
entails some degree of public defamation of suspected offenders, because of the nature of the 
                                                 
30 However, gain elimination does appear to be the goal of tort law in the area of punitive damages. See Hylton, 
supra note 17, at 439.   
31 Posner, supra note 29, at 1195-98. 
32 At least in retrospect, taking the current allocation of enforcement as given, the Neoclassical model offers a 
rationalization.  However, as a matter of initial design, the Neoclassical model seems to offer no prescription on the 
choice between public and private enforcement of law.  The fact that offenders are often judgment-proof might 
provide a justification for public enforcement within the Neoclassical model.  However, the judgment-proof problem 
provides a rather insecure foundation for public enforcement. 
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general category of offenses.  To be labeled a “criminal suspect” is to be put in the same 
category as murderers, kidnappers, etc.  Such publicly defamatory treatment of suspected 
offenders would be excessive in instances where the mere internalization of losses, while 
allowing the underlying activity giving rise to the loss to continue, is the accepted goal of 
enforcement. 
Just as the tort system has a comparative advantage in internalizing losses, the criminal justice 
system has a comparative advantage in completely deterring socially harmful activity.  First, the 
prohibitory and preemptive functions of punishment are often best carried out by the criminal 
enforcement system than by private litigation.  Private plaintiffs are unlikely to take on the 
preemptive role because it is costly and because doing so would provide an unremunerative 
public good.  The individually rational thing to do would be to free ride on the enforcement 
effort of others.  The prohibitory and preemptive functions require investigation and crime 
detection efforts in many cases.33  Private individuals would not have incentives to investigate 
crimes, and would free ride on the efforts of any private individuals who took on the burden of 
investigation and detection.  Even victims of consummated crimes may be unable or unwilling to 
bring an action against the perpetrator: the victim could be dead or disabled, or fear retribution 
from the offender.  For these reasons, the criminal justice system is preferable when the goal of 
enforcement is complete deterrence.  
Public Choice and Criminal Law Enforcement 
The Neoclassical model is incomplete as a positive theory of criminal law, and raises serious 
questions as a normative theory too.  Its most significant flaw is its failure to incorporate the 
problem of rent-seeking – or, more generally, public choice theory – in the theory of optimal law 
enforcement.34 
A system of harsh punishments encourages rent-seeking (for example, bribe taking) on the part 
of law enforcement officials. A mundane account of rent-seeking in law enforcement was offered 
in a recent article in The Economist on corruption in Sierra Leone.  The article begins:   
At a busy intersection in downtown Freetown, motorbike-taxi drivers wait for 
customers. They pass the time telling tales of petty corruption. “Yesterday I was 
chased by two policemen,” says a young man, slouched forward on his bike seat. 
“They told me I was violating a law when I wasn’t, and confiscated my 
                                                 
33 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 45, 46 (2000). 
34 On the public choice model of law enforcement, see David Friedman, Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of 
Inefficient Punishment, 107 J. POL. ECON. S259, S262-63 (1999); Hylton & Khanna, supra note 17; Keith N. Hylton 
& Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Political Economy of Criminal Procedure, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 171-06 (Gerrit D. Geest ed., 2d ed. 2009).  On public choice considerations and the enactment of 
criminal statutes, see Paul J. Larkin, Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
715, 735-37 (2013).  
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motorbike. I had to pay 100,000 leones ($18) to get it back.” Two other drivers 
butt in, eager to trump his story with their own.35 
The experience of the motorbike driver should be predicted in a regime where law enforcement 
agents act rationally to maximize their income at opportune moments.  The incentives for 
enforcement agents to behave in the same manner as do the police in Sierra Leone exist to some 
degree in every law enforcement regime. 
Rent-seeking provides a direct mechanism by which unnecessarily harsh punishments can cause 
social welfare to decline – a view that is consistent with Beccaria’s arguments concerning the 
adverse effects of harsh punishment but never alluded to in his work.  As the harshness of 
penalties increases, law enforcement agents have greater leverage with which to seek bribes, 
which can be demanded of the guilty and the innocent alike. 
For example, if jaywalkers were subjected to the death penalty, an unnecessarily harsh 
punishment to deter such a crime, then law enforcement agents could threaten each jaywalker 
with execution, and in return for declining to arrest, demand an exorbitant payment as tribute.  
For the same reason, the criminal justice system must constrain the discretion of law enforcers, 
for otherwise each enforcer could target individuals for bribes, or could carry out their work at 
the behest of private individuals or groups.36  These observations imply that the criminal justice 
system should be saddled with constraints to ensure that it is not used as a method of enrichment 
for enforcement agents, or as a method of predation among social factions. 
This public choice perspective on criminal justice, which views law enforcement agents as self-
interested utility maximizers, delivers implications that are opposite many of those of the 
internalization theory, and temper those of the Classical (or complete) deterrence model.  
Consider, for example, the number of enforcement agents.  While the internalization approach 
would reduce the number of agents and substitute a more severe penalty to maintain deterrence, 
the public choice model would recommend retaining a sufficient number of agents to make 
bribery difficult to conceal.37  Consider also the notion, from the internalization model, of 
reducing the probability of enforcement and increasing the penalty.  Such a policy would make 
the problem of rent-seeking even greater because it would be far easier for an enforcement agent 
to threaten to impose an enormous fine against any individual he chose to target. 
In comparison to the complete deterrence model, the public choice perspective provides a 
stronger and more consistent reason for moderating punishments than the norm-centered 
arguments of Beccaria.  Setting punishments well above the minimum necessary to completely 
deter offensive conduct would exacerbate the rent-seeking problem.  Hence, minimizing the 
                                                 
35 Corruption in Sierra Leone: Call it in, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/middle-
east-and-africa/21710282-putting-technology-work-root-out-graft-call-it. 
36 Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 72-78.  
37 Obviously, bribery can be deterred by punishing agents who accept bribes.  But it is unlikely that bribery can be 
eliminated in every setting.  Agents’ rewards from bribery may be too high relative to the expected penalties to 
completely eliminate corruption in enforcement. See Sanja K. Ivkovic, To Serve and Collect: Measuring Police 
Corruption, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 637 (2003) (noting the relatively low frequency of successful 
punishments against police officers engaging in lucrative bribes).  
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excess above the minimum necessary to completely deter – that is, taking the fat out of the 
penalty – and constraining official discretion can be seen as important tools for controlling the 
predatory incentives of enforcement agents.  The rent-seeking model would impose a high 
burden of proof on the enforcement agent to minimize the agent’s discretion to punish.38  The 
reasonable doubt rule, enshrined in In Re Winship39 as the prosecutor’s burden of proof for a 
criminal conviction under the Due Process Clause, is a direct implication of the public choice 
model.40  
Under the public choice model, the degree of rent-seeking or corruption associated with criminal 
law enforcement should vary directly with two variables: the degree of discretion given to 
enforcement agents and the punishment stakes for the offender.41  As the degree of discretion 
increases, the enforcer has greater power to seek a bribe or to seek some end that favors a 
particular individual or group with which he is affiliated.  As the punishment stakes increase, the 
enforcer is in a better position, other things equal, to demand a bribe, and the offenders (or others 
involved in the criminalized activity) are more likely to offer a bribe.  Another factor that 
generates corruption is the difference between punishment stakes and the compensation of 
enforcers.  As the monetary punishment stakes increase relative to the compensation of 
enforcers, the scope for mutually agreeable bribes increases. 
The incentive to bribe an enforcement agent who has discretionary authority will inevitably be 
limited by the offender’s ability to protect himself from predatory demands from the 
enforcement agent.  Suppose the offender wishes to continue in some potentially unlawful 
enterprise, but must pay a continuing bribe to avoid apprehension.  If the enforcement agent’s 
discretion to demand bribes were unlimited, what would keep the agent from demanding all of 
the wealth of the offender?  The risk of being revealed by the offender as an unfaithful 
enforcement agent is one potential limit, but this may be insufficient – the offender’s desire to 
operate in secrecy may prevent him from publicly disclosing his bribery of the agent.  A more 
likely outcome is that the offender responds with force to protect his wealth or the earnings from 
his unlawful enterprise.  Thus, as discretion expands and the differential between punishment 
stakes and enforcer compensation increases, one should observe both an increase in the 
incentives for bribery and other forms of rent-seeking, and an increase in the coercive force 
potential of offenders.  Such an increase may lead to an “arms race” in coercive force between 
enforcement agents and offenders, resulting in excessive arms held by offenders and the 
militarization of enforcement agents.42 
Rent-seeking in enforcement distorts enforcement incentives and undermines the deterrent effect 
of law enforcement.  Corrupted enforcement agents may target innocent individuals for 
punishment and at the same time avoid apprehending the guilty.  This approach to law 
enforcement reduces the differential in the expected penalty faced by innocent and guilty actors, 
                                                 
38 Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 68-72 (discussing public choice theory of reasonable doubt rule). 
39 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970). 
40 Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 68-72. 
41 Friedman, supra note 34, at S267-68; Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 104-06. 
42 RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA'S POLICE FORCES 33 (2013). 
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and thereby weakens the incentive to comply with the law, generating more crime.43  In addition, 
as such distortions become more common, individuals will have greater incentives to bribe 
agents to avoid being punished arbitrarily.  Thus, rent-seeking leads to greater costs from crime 
and at the same, costlier enforcement activity by corrupted agents. 
Because of the costs of corruption, penalties should be moderated and the discretion of enforcers 
circumscribed.  These suggestions are borne out in the law in the U.S.  Prison sentences for many 
crimes, such as burglary, and could be set considerably higher and still remain consistent with 
the complete deterrence goal.44  That they have not been set as high as the internalization model 
would recommend may reflect a general awareness of the adverse consequences of unnecessarily 
severe punishments.  Several criminal procedure rules appear to be designed to limit 
prosecutorial discretion, and this can easily be explained by public choice considerations.45 
The worrisome implications of enforcement discretion have been on display in many countries, 
especially China.  There, individual police officers have had the nearly unfettered power, until 
recently, to incarcerate individuals, without a criminal conviction, in re-education camps within 
the laojiao system46 – the parallel and larger laogai system of camps housing criminal 
convicts.47  The unfettered discretion to assign individuals into the laojiao system gave each 
police officer the power to demand bribes from individuals who wished to avoid being 
imprisoned.  The Chinese government recently imposed restrictions on this discretion, limiting 
the officer’s power to incarcerate to a few types of offenders, such as drug addicts.48  This 
limitation may not be effective because provincial governments may not ensure perfect 
compliance with the central government’s orders, and, more importantly, police officers retain 
the discretion to determine whether an individual falls within one of the permitted categories for 
imprisonment in the laojiao system. 
In June 2016, the prime minister of Bangladesh, responding to a spate of terrorist murders, 
ordered his police to pursue individuals suspected of terrorist sympathies, leading to over 10,000 
arrests.49  Some speculated that aside from the benefit to the prime minister from incarcerating 
political opponents, one important reason for such a broad order was to enable the police to 
collect bribes.  The average bribe to free an individual after an arrest was between $102 - $255, 
and up to $1,250 could be charged to free a member of the local Islamist political party, Jamaat-
                                                 
43 Hylton & Khanna, supra note 16, at 81 (discussing deterrence under corrupt enforcement).  
44 Richard P. Adelstein, Institutional Function and Evolution in the Criminal Process, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 41 
(1981). 
45 Hylton and Khanna, supra note 16, at 84-88 (using public choice model to explain reasonable doubt rule, double 
jeopardy, ex post facto prohibition, void for vagueness doctrine, and other rules of criminal procedure). 
46 On the laojiao system, see, e.g., Labour Camps: Demanding Justice, ECONOMIST (Sept. 1, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21561937. 
47 Minami Funakoshi, China’s ‘Re-Education Through Labor’ System: The View from Within, ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/chinas-re-education-through-labor-system-the-
view-from-within/272913/.  
48 See, e.g., Labour Camps: Long Overdue, ECONOMIST  (Jan. 12, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21569448-government-says-it-will-reform-its-system-labour-camps-long-
overdue. 
49 See Mass Arrests in Bangladesh: Round up the Usual Suspects, ECONOMIST, June 18, 2016, at 37. 
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e-Islami.50  Since the average police pay was only $250 per month,51 an officer could earn as 
much as a half-year’s salary by arresting a Jamaat activist. 
Types of Punishment Regime 
Criminal offenses can be broken up into three categories: common law crimes, unlawful 
unilateral or coordinated business conduct, and unlawful market exchanges.  The common law 
crimes consist of the familiar subjects of criminal law: murder, rape, battery, and robbery.52  The 
second category, consisting of unlawful business conduct, is exemplified by the Sherman Act, 
which prohibits price fixing cartels and monopolistic conduct.53  However, criminal prosecutions 
under the Sherman Act have been limited to price fixing cartels.54  The third category consists of 
market exchanges that the state prohibits, such as usurious transactions,55 sales of illegal drugs,56 
sales of renewable tissue and organs,57 and prostitution.58  
The alternative to criminal law enforcement is private enforcement through the tort system.  A 
decision on the scope of criminal law is in essence a decision on the boundary between criminal 
law and tort law.  To define this boundary one must first isolate the features that distinguish 
criminal law from tort law.  There are two essential distinctions that I will recognize in this 
framework.  The first is that criminal law generally seeks to completely deter or prohibit, while 
tort law seeks primarily to internalize harms.  These are default positions, to be sure; criminal 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 25. 
53 The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012).  
54 Criminal Program Update 2015, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/criminal-
program-update, (last visited Feb. 26, 2017). 
55 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 86 (2012) (providing that the entire interest is forfeited in the event that the interest rate 
exceeds the limits outlined in section 85 of the title); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49 (2017) (prohibiting the 
charging, taking, or receiving of more than twenty percent of the loan in interest and fees in exchange for a loan); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.45 (McKinney 2017) (prohibiting the knowing possession of usurious loan records); 18 PA. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4806.3 (West 2016) (prohibiting as a felony engaging or conspiring to commit criminal 
usury).  
56 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012) (prohibiting drug trafficking); id. at § 844 (2012) (prohibiting drug possession 
within federal jurisdictions); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/401 (LexisNexis 2017) (prohibiting the manufacturing 
or delivering of a controlled substance); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32E (2017) (prohibiting the trafficking of 
marijuana, cocaine, heroin, morphine, and opium); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.43 (McKinney 2017) (prohibiting as a 
first-degree felony the knowing and unlawful distribution of two ounces or more of controlled substances). 
57 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012) (prohibiting the sale of human organs within interstate or foreign commerce); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f (West 2017) (prohibiting the sale of human organs); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-160 (West 
2017) (prohibiting the sale of human body parts as a felony); IND. CODE § 35-46-5-1 (West 2016) (prohibiting the 
sale of human organs, including the kidney, liver, heart, lung, cornea, eye, bone marrow, bone, pancreas, or skin, as 
a felony); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 113A, § 16 (2017) (prohibiting the sale of body parts).  
58 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012) (prohibiting the transportation of individuals within interstate or foreign 
commerce with the intent to engage in prostitution); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 53A (2017) (prohibiting engaging 
in sexual conduct with another for a fee); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5902 (West 2016) (prohibiting 
persons from engaging in sexual activity as a business or otherwise loitering in public view to be hired for sexual 




law in some special applications seeks to internalize harms (criminal fines for price fixing),59 
while tort law in special applications aims to completely deter (punitive damages).60  The second 
essential distinction is that criminal law assumes the involvement of public enforcement agents, 
at the apprehension stage of enforcement at least, while tort law operates largely through private 
enforcement efforts. 
Punishment, like the scope of the law, can be broken down into general categories.  The most 
general division is between prison sentences and monetary penalties.  The category of monetary 
penalties can be broken down further into monetary penalties imposed by the state and private 
damages awards given to plaintiffs.   For simplicity, I will say there are three main types of 
punishment: prison sentences, fines, and damages to victims.  In theory, at least, exposure of a 
crime is a separate punishment by itself.  If a government investigates and determines that an 
individual or firm committed a crime, the naming and public identification of the offender can be 
considered a form of punishment to the extent that it harms reputation and exposes the offender 
to retaliation and private lawsuits.61 
A narrow criminal punishment system would limit the scope of criminal prohibitions to just the 
common law crimes, and limit the harshest punishment, prison sentences, to the same category.  
The broadest criminal punishment system would criminalize activities in all three categories of 
offense and impose prison sentences as the presumptive punishment across the board.  Several 
variations exist between these two poles.  How should one choose the right variation of both the 
scope of criminal prohibitions and the harshness of punishment? 
Consider, for example, the optimal scope of criminal prohibitions.  As the scope broadens from 
the first category (common law crimes) to the third category (market activities), the factors that 
encourage rent-seeking are more likely to be observed.  The gap between punishment stakes and 
the compensation of enforcers widens.  In addition, the degree of discretion exercised by 
enforcers generally increases as the scope broadens from the first to the third category.  This 
implies that the cost of criminal law enforcement generally increases, because of rent-seeking, as 
the scope increases – again, expanding beyond common law crimes outward to incorporate 
market activity.  Given this increase in cost, the benefit to society from enforcing must increase 
at a faster rate to justify the expansion in scope on social welfare grounds.  
The Case for Limiting the Scope of Criminal Law 
                                                 
59 For a discussion of internalization and antitrust penalties, see KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 43-52 (2003).  
60 On punitive damages and prohibition, see David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An 
Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 17-21 (1990); Hylton, supra 
note 18, at 439-40.  
61 Michael L. Denger, D. Jarrett Arp, Does our Multifaceted Enforcement System Promote Sound Competition 
Policy?, 15 ANTITRUST 41, 42-43 (2001) (outlining various civil “follow-up” actions against criminal antitrust 
violators); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 368-72 (1999) (proposing the inclusion of public shaming as a 




Taking the first category (common law crimes) as the most basic, the scope of prohibitions could 
range from category one (common law crimes), to categories “one plus two” (common law 
crimes plus business activities), to categories “one plus two plus three” (common law crimes 
plus business activities plus market exchanges).  This framework implicitly rules out the 
possibility of a regime in which category three actions (market exchanges) were unlawful while 
category one actions (e.g., murder) were lawful.  Although such a regime is suggested as 
possible in this framework, it would both violate the basic premises of the Classical and 
Neoclassical punishment models and be inconsistent with any of the legal systems ever observed.  
Most legal systems start with prohibitions of the most harmful crimes and gradually expand to 
prohibit a broader range of potentially harmful conduct.62 
I will take it as given that the criminal law should and will continue to apply to the standard 
common law crimes (category one).  The policy reasons for adopting this position are suggested 
by the theory surveyed earlier in this paper.  These are crimes that can be viewed as efforts to 
bypass markets (or consensual exchange) and the law should generally seek to eliminate the 
prospect of gain from such behavior.  As technology changes, the specific actions falling under 
the category of common law crimes will naturally expand to include modern variations of 
ancient crimes, such as cybertheft.63 
I contend that the boundary of criminal law should end with the category of common law crimes 
and their modern variants.  The general presumption should be that criminal law does not extend 
to market exchanges, such as consensual adult prostitution, or to unlawful commercial conduct, 
such as price fixing, unrelated to the basic set of common law crimes. 
Markets and Criminal Law 
First, consider the space of market exchanges.  Criminal law should be ousted from this space.  
To be clear, this means that the state should not apply its criminal prohibitions to voluntary 
market exchanges between rational adults, such as prostitution, usury, or drug transactions.64  
This is not to say that no law should operate at all;65 tort law, for example, should continue to 
regulate.  But as a general rule criminal law should not prohibit market exchanges. 
                                                 
62 OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (1881). 
63 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (prohibiting fraudulent schemes to obtain money or property through the use of 
wire, radio or television transmissions in interstate or foreign commerce); CO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-5.5-102 (West 
2016) (defining as a computer crime accessing any computer, computer network, or computer system with the intent 
to commit a theft); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §164.377 (West 2016) (prohibiting computer crimes, including theft via 
use of a computer, computer system or computer network); 18 PA. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7611 (West 2016) 
(defining the offense of unlawful use of a computer as accessing any computer, computer system, computer 
network, computer software, computer program, computer database, World Wide Web site or telecommunication 
device with the intent to defraud).  
64 Obviously, this argument does not apply to market exchanges that do not consist exclusively of rational adults, 
such as child prostitution.  Criminal prohibition should continue to apply to such transactions on the ground that at 
least one of the parties is unable to be a competent party to the contract.  The purchaser who takes advantage of a 
party who is incompetent to form a contract can be subjected to criminal punishment under this policy.   
65 What if the participants in a criminalized market prefer that the market remain criminalized?  For example, if the 
participants, through bribery, have made suitable arrangements with enforcement agents, they may prefer that the 
market remain criminalized. However, this is unpersuasive as an argument for criminalization, because it is little 
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Why?  Consider, for example, the sale of an item by a seller to a willing buyer – for example, the 
sale of marijuana.  If we view the seller as the violator of the law, then the basis for completely 
deterring his conduct, following the Classical model, is difficult to find.  In the typical common 
law crime (e.g., robbery), the offender takes an action that harms the victim.  The seller of 
marijuana, however, takes no action that harms his purchaser; indeed, he satisfies a desire of the 
purchaser.  Of course the purchaser pays for the marijuana, and perhaps that can be considered 
the harm suffered.  But the purchaser pays only because the benefit he perceives from 
consumption is greater than the price he pays, so his ultimate perception is that he gains on net 
from the transaction.  Since there is no net harm imposed on the purchaser, there is no utilitarian 
basis for completely deterring the seller’s conduct. 
One might argue that the harm to the victim can be found in the victim’s failure to realize the 
harm he imposes on himself by consuming marijuana.  This self-imposed harm theory assumes 
that the purchaser fails to correctly perceive his own utility, and whether it has improved or 
deteriorated after consumption of marijuana.  However, if this is a valid basis for treating the sale 
of marijuana as an imposition of harm by the seller on the purchaser, then the same basis can be 
relied on to treat the sale of many other products or services as a net harm to the purchaser.  
Individuals who sell directly to consumers fatty foods, or foods with a high sugar content, could 
be convicted under the criminal law and imprisoned under the same theory.   
Further, prohibiting a market on the theory that consumers in the market impose harm on 
themselves fails to consider the harms that would result from prohibition.  Prohibiting a market 
does not make the market disappear.  Transactions continue, hidden from public view.66  
Underground markets are likely to result in much greater harms suffered by purchasers than 
would open markets capable of being regulated and governed by legal rules.  Underground drug 
markets are more likely to include contaminated products.67  Similarly, criminalized sex markets 
are more likely to involve coercion.68 
                                                 
more than a rationalization for regulating entry to uphold the prices of incumbent suppliers.  One case that may seem 
to provide a counterargument is the decriminalization of prostitution in Zimbabwe in 2016.  See Why Some 
Prostitutes Would Rather their Jobs Were Illegal: Decriminalizing the Sex Trade in Zimbabwe, ECONOMIST (Jan. 5, 
2017), http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21713866-less-stigma-more-competition-
decriminalising-sex-trade-zimbabwe.  Older prostitutes complained that the market was flooded after 
decriminalization by younger prostitutes who drove prices down to extremely low levels.  However, this appears to 
be an unusual case reflecting the extreme poverty resulting from the mismanagement of Zimbabwe’s economy by 
Robert Mugabe, driving many young women into the market for prostitution.  The Zimbabwe example also reflects 
a failure to appropriately regulate the decriminalized prostitution market – for example, by requiring registration or 
taking other steps to prevent coercion. 
66 Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIS. L. 
REV. 1305, 1314-19 (summarizing the various estimates of the size of the illegal black market for cocaine). 
67 See, e.g., Dangers Caused by the Prohibition Law, UKCIA, http://www.ukcia.org/culture/effects/law2.php (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2017) (“Perhaps one of the greatest dangers posed by prohibition is the uncertain nature of the 
commercial supply. Most cannabis in the UK is supplied by a massive and unregulated industry.”). 
68 See Scott Cunningham & Manisha Shah, Decriminalizing Indoor Prostitution: 
Implications for Sexual Violence and Public Health 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20281, 
2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20281.pdf (“Not surprisingly, we find that decriminalization increased the size 
of the indoor market. However, we also find that decriminalization caused both forcible rape offenses and gonorrhea 
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Another argument for treating the sale of marijuana as a harm imposed by the seller would point 
to externalities, that is, harms that fall on third parties.  The purchaser of marijuana is likely to 
work less effectively,69 or to drive under the influence – all activities that may impose a risk of 
harm on others.70  This argument, like the preceding one, has a nearly unlimited scope of 
application.  One could argue, for example, that a person who enters into a consensual amorous 
relationship with another may be so distracted and absorbed by infatuation that he is unable to 
work productively, or to competently manage an automobile on the roads.  By the same 
reasoning, one could impose a criminal prohibition on all amorous relationships.  As for the 
evidence, there is little to suggest that marijuana imposes an unusual risk on users or third parties 
compared to legal and potentially harmful substances such as alcohol.71   
Admittedly, there is some degree of external harm that might justify criminal prohibition of a 
market.  But this should be observed only under rare conditions.  In the vast majority of cases, it 
should be sufficient to apply the criminal prohibition directly to the conduct that generates 
injury.  For example, consider a drug that causes consumers to commit acts of violence.   It 
should be possible, in most cases, to provide a sufficient deterrent by punishing offenders for 
committing the violent acts rather than the consumption of the drug.  Punishing consumers for 
the mere act of consuming the drug would be a justifiable preemptive policy only if consumption 
of the drug led consumers to immediately commit violent acts without any process of decision 
making on their parts, and consumers were unable to determine in advance that the drug would 
have such an effect.  However, if consumers could determine in advance that the drug would 
cause them to commit violent acts, then imposing sufficient penalties for commission of the acts, 
when under the influence of the drug, would deter either consumption of the drug or the 
commission of violent acts after consumption.  The instances in which it would be necessary for 
                                                 
incidence to decline for the overall population. Our synthetic control model finds 824 fewer reported rape offenses 
(31 percent decrease) and 1,035 fewer cases of female gonorrhea (39 percent decrease) from 2004 to 2009.”). 
69 See, e.g., Roxanne Kahmsi, How Safe is Recreational Marijuana?, SCI. AM. (June 1, 2013), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-safe-recreational-marijuana/ (“Marijuana also temporarily impairs 
an array of mental abilities, especially memory and attention. Dozens of studies have shown, for example, that 
people under the influence of marijuana perform worse on tests of working memory, which is the ability to 
temporarily hold and manipulate information in one's mind. Participants in these studies have greater difficulty 
remembering and reciting short lists of numerals and random words. Research has further revealed that cannabis 
blunts concentration, weakens motor coordination and interferes with the ability to quickly scan one's surroundings 
for obstacles.”) 
70 Id. (“In driving-simulation and closed-course studies, people on marijuana are slower to hit the brakes and worse 
at safely changing lanes. Investigators still debate, however, at what point these impairments translate to more traffic 
accidents.”).  
71 On marijuana compared to alcohol, see Ruth Weissenborn & David J. Nutt, Popular Intoxicants: What Lessons 
can be Learned from the Last 40 Years of Alcohol and Cannabis Regulation?, 26 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 213, 
218 (2012) (concluding that a “direct comparison of alcohol and cannabis showed that alcohol was considered to be 
more than twice as harmful as cannabis to [individual] users, and five times more harmful as cannabis to others 
(society).”).  In addition, a 2009 review published in the British Columbia Mental Health and Addictions Journal 
estimated that health-related costs per user are eight times higher for drinkers of alcoholic beverages than they are 
for those who use cannabis, and are more than 40 times higher for tobacco smokers. Gerald Thomas & Chris Davis, 
Comparing Risk of Harm and Costs to Society, 5 B.C. MENTAL HEALTH & ADDICTIONS J. 11, 13 (2009) (“In terms 
of [health-related] costs per user: Tobacco-related health costs are over $800 per user, alcohol-related health costs 
are much lower at $165 per user, and cannabis-related health costs are the lowest at $20 per user.”).  
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deterrence purposes to punish consumers for the mere act of consumption should be extremely 
rare. 
Nothing in this argument suggests that it would be undesirable for the state to impose harsher 
penalties on harmful acts committed under the influence of drugs.  Indeed, it may be desirable to 
do so, provided that the penalty is triggered by the harmful act rather than the mere consumption 
of the drug.  In the cases where the drug impairs the consumer’s ability to think rationally or to 
discern right from wrong after consumption, it may be advisable for deterrence purposes to 
increase the penalty for commission of crimes under the influence to induce the consumer to take 
the penalty into account in the period of full rationality before consuming the drug.  Any specific 
level of deterrence of harmful acts associated with the consumption of a drug should be 
achievable by punishing the harmful acts themselves rather than the consumption of the drug.  
The punishment geared to violent acts alters the terms of trade in a manner that would discourage 
the violence-prone from consuming the drug without affecting the consumption incentives of the 
nonviolent. Indeed, imposing the penalty on consumption rather than the harmful act could 
perversely increase the frequency of harmful acts if the violence-prone are prevalent among the 
consumers with the greatest demand for the drug. 
Now consider the purchaser of marijuana as the violator of the law. The only basis for 
prohibiting the simple act of purchase (or consumption) would be the belief that the purchaser is 
hurting himself unknowingly – as if the purchaser had acquired poison falsely labeled as a 
painkiller.  However, there is no basis within the utilitarian punishment framework for using the 
criminal laws to punish someone for unknowingly hurting himself.  The Neoclassical model of 
punishment requires a division between areas of activity where harms are generated as an 
unintentional byproduct of legitimate activities and areas of activity where crimes result from the 
intentional imposition of harm.  A buyer of marijuana, however, in no sense intentionally 
imposes harm on anyone; any harm he imposes by the mere act of purchase or consumption 
would be on himself alone, and unintentional.  Under the rationale that such unknowing 
infliction of self-harm could justify criminal punishment, the state could as easily punish people 
who purchase and consume too much butter, or drink too much soda. 
As noted earlier, a secondary basis for limiting the use of criminal law can be found in the 
process of apprehension and punishment.  Criminal enforcement often involves preemptive 
efforts, such as surveillance, and harsh methods of apprehension.  However, if the activity is one 
that enhances welfare generally, such preemptive effort and accompanying intrusive enforcement 
methods would be undesirable.  The goal of preemption itself is undesirable, so the enforcement 
methods associated with preemption would also be undesirable. 
Public Choice and Scope Considerations 
In addition to the generally weak basis for deterrence in the case of a consensual market 
transaction, the case for criminal prohibition is further weakened, if not entirely vitiated, by the 
public choice issues generated by criminal enforcement in this context.  To enforce a prohibition 
against market transactions, such as marijuana sales, law enforcement agents must be prepared to 
intervene in the transaction between a willing buyer and seller, and proceed to apprehend and 
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punish one or both of the parties.  If the parties are aware of this, they will attempt to arrange 
their transaction away from the watchful eye of the enforcement agent.  If the enforcement agent 
merely stands in the public square and looks for transactions, he will never see any, because 
individuals will arrange their transactions in private venues away from public view. 
Recognizing that transactions will take place in privacy, the state, to enforce the criminal law, 
will demand the right to pierce the private sphere to observe potentially unlawful transactions 
and to find violations of the law.  This effort immediately puts the state at odds with the 
individual and sacrifices autonomy, privacy, freedom of association, and other desirable traits of 
a relatively free and open society to the enforcement goals of criminal prohibition.  To enforce 
the law, the state will have to monitor the private conduct of individuals, to listen in on their 
private conversations, and to follow them into their private meeting spaces.  Such surveillance 
may be justifiable under certain conditions, but it should be viewed as an evil which must be 
embraced only to prevent a much greater evil from occurring.  However, the rather negligible 
evil associated with the consumption of substances such as marijuana is insufficient to justify the 
surveillance of individuals.   
To the extent that profiling based on data is just an especially efficient form of surveillance, this 
argument applies just as well to such actuarial methods of surveillance.72  There is no reason to 
believe that surveillance is inherently harmful to social welfare.  The relevant inquiry is whether 
the benefits of surveillance justify its costs to society, and that will depend on its purpose (as 
well as effects) in particular instances.  In many market exchange settings, the benefits of 
surveillance – whether through direct observation or through profiling based on data – will not 
justify the costs.73 
Moreover, surveillance itself is necessarily a discretionary activity of enforcers.  This is so 
because enforcement agents cannot monitor everyone.  Unless the state adopts a blanket policy 
of surveillance, law enforcers will have to choose to monitor some individuals and not others.  
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These decisions will inevitably be political in nature, leading to charges of bias and unfairness.  
Willing transactions between buyers and sellers are likely to take place in almost every 
community of the state.  Enforcers, however, might be reluctant to aggressively pursue potential 
violations within their own communities, because of the ostracism such action might bring.  
Once the decision to monitor is viewed as at least partly political, the potential for the unequal 
treatment and abuse of potential offenders becomes clear. 
If the state were to avoid the unfairness charge by monitoring everyone, then matters could be 
much worse – as Edward Snowden famously intimated after revealing U.S. government 
surveillance methods and then fleeing to Moscow.74  A state that monitors everyone gathers up 
evidence that can be used to charge almost anyone with a violation of the law, or at least a 
violation of the public’s expectations of honest and upstanding conduct.  For example, even the 
most diligent employees sometimes loaf off on the job.  A surveillance system that gathered all 
such evidence would put everyone at risk of punishment or at least public embarrassment.  
Enforcement agents would then be in a position to demand bribes from individuals to avoid 
punishment or public shame, or to arbitrarily punish.75 
 In addition to the risks associated with unchecked enforcement discretion, the danger of 
imposing criminal law on market transactions such as the sale of marijuana is that the 
punishment stakes will increase with the demand on the market.  If the product is highly 
desirable, then purchasers will offer large sums for the product, and the bids for the product will 
be large enough to cover the cost of compromising enforcement agents.  As the market value of 
the banned substance increases, the level of corruption within the enforcement body will tend to 
increase too.  Outsiders may view enforcement agents as corrupt, or backward, when in fact, they 
have been put to a task that is almost rationally infeasible. 
Ready examples of the disabling effect of corruption on law enforcement are observed in foreign 
countries.  Law enforcement in Mexico is seriously weakened by corruption induced by the 
illegal markets for drugs – both in the market there and in the U.S.  A recent report suggests that 
half a dozen of the country’s thirty-one states have become ungovernable because of organized 
crime connected to the drug trade.76   In September 2014, forty-three student teachers were 
killed, presumably by members of drug gangs; reports suggest that the teachers were handed 
over to the gangs by local police officers.77  In July 2015, a drug gang chief, El Chapo, rode out 
of a maximum-security Mexican prison on a motorcycle through an illuminated, ventilated, mile-
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long tunnel dug from under his cell.78  Roughly seventy-five percent of murders in Mexico go 
unsolved, while at the same time ninety percent of convictions are based on confessions, many 
procured through beatings and torture.79 
The general picture of criminal law enforcement in Mexico confirms some of the most ominous 
predictions of the public choice model of criminal law.  Enforcement agents often work at the 
behest of criminal gangs, and shift blame away from gang members to innocent individuals.  As 
a consequence, the deterrent value of law enforcement has been compromised.  Murders go 
unsolved, while innocents are accused of committing them.  Chiefs of drug gangs do not go to 
prison, or they leave prison on their own terms at a time of their choosing.  Individuals who upset 
powerful gangs can be served up to them, for torture or murder, by the police. 
One important feature of Mexican law enforcement is the enormous gap between the punishment 
stakes and the compensation of enforcers.  The average pay of Mexican police officers is $350 
per month.80  The drug market is a hugely valuable business largely driven by demand of 
consumers in the U.S.  The Mexican state is no match on economic grounds for the powerful 
market forces on the side of the drug gangs.  These market forces have penetrated the criminal 
law enforcement process at all levels in Mexico.81 
Law enforcement agents receive higher wages in the U.S. ($4,400 per month)82 than in Mexico, 
and thus the differential between punishment stakes and enforcer compensation is not as wide in 
the U.S. as in Mexico.  Still, the same corruption issues inherent to any system that attempts to 
use the criminal law enforcement process to suppress a market are observed in the U.S.  These 
issues sit in the background of a controversial study of police enforcement in America that 
concluded that efforts to racially diversify police forces led to more crime.83  The connection 
between crime and racial diversity asserted by the author, John Lott, was a causal one in which 
racial diversification led to an intellectually less competent police force, which in turn led to 
more crime.  The precise mechanism behind this causal relationship is not stated clearly in Lott’s 
article.  Moreover, although Lott’s regression analysis attempts to control for the reverse 
causality problem – that is, that attempts to racially diversify police departments may be caused 
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by crime rather than being a cause of crime – one cannot be sure that the causation problem was 
adequately addressed.  Putting the causation question aside, the mechanism suggested by the 
study is that a police officer who could not add a series of numbers as quickly as another would 
be more likely to excuse criminal conduct or fail to recognize violations of the law.  However, 
Lott’s regression analysis does not draw directly on test score data, relying instead on measures 
of the percentage of police officers identified as minorities as independent variables.84   
The public choice perspective provides an alternative explanation for Lott’s results, and one that 
does not tend toward racism.  In urban areas with large minority populations, new officers hired 
to racially diversify the police force would be drawn directly form the populations where much 
of the criminal activity takes place.  These new, relatively low-wage recruits would be especially 
vulnerable to bribes from criminal gangs operating in the same areas, just as the local Mexican 
police officers appear to be now.  They would sometimes have connections of family and 
friendship with members of the drug gangs.  As a result, the new officers would tend to be more 
vulnerable to corruption, because of their relatively low compensation and social connections 
among the population of offenders.  In addition, the new officers would tend to have better 
information on the actual risk associated with a particular criminal suspect and the potentially 
negative consequences of incarceration, another factor that might lead to a more conservative 
approach to enforcement.  These incentives could easily generate the patterns in the data reported 
by Lott, without having any relationship with the intellectual competence of the new officers.  
Indeed, from this perspective one might find, among the recruits, an inverse relationship between 
measured cognitive skills and reluctance to accept a bribe to forgo taking enforcement action 
when the costs of such action would exceed the benefits. 
In addition to efforts to avoid enforcement leading in turn to surveillance, applying criminal law 
to market activities induces participants in the market to resort to coercive force.  One reason is 
because the criminalization of market activity induces participants, unable to enforce their 
agreements by legal means, to use force to administer agreements.85  The same actors may use 
force to protect their markets from entry by rivals.86  Specialization in the use of force becomes 
an important skill that will be demanded by participants in other illegal activities too.  Over time, 
drug markets become populated with individuals who are especially suited to the use of force.  
Through this process, criminalization produces the very violence that generates calls for 
continued criminalization. Unsurprisingly, expansions of illegal drugs markets are associated 
with rising crime, but this is because of a reverse causation process in which the criminalization 
of drugs markets induces criminal involvement, which in turn generates crime.  In Detroit, 
murders grew quickly as the heroin market expanded within the city in the 1970s.  But this is 
probably not because heroin makes people murderous or especially violent, indeed it is 
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categorized as a depressant.87  The penetration and expansion of the market for heroin brought in 
criminal gangs that specialized in the use of force to protect markets and enforce agreements.  
Those same gangs used bribery and infiltration to hobble the Detroit police force. 
Some have charged that ousting criminal law from the market for marijuana would not be 
without significant costs.  Marijuana has been called a gateway to more harmful drugs.  
However, the record on legalization has not supported this long-standing critique of legalization.  
Portugal, for example, decriminalized the possession of all drugs for personal use in 2001.88   At 
present, lifetime marijuana use is lower in Portugal than in the European Union generally, and 
the use of other drugs (illicit in other countries) has been falling.89  The rate of HIV infection 
from the use of infected needles has plummeted in Portugal.90  While Portugal may not be 
representative of every country that chooses to oust criminal law from the market for marijuana, 
it stands as evidence that decriminalization does not necessarily lead to greater or more harmful 
use, and the costs associated with such use.  In the United States, the recent wave of state level 
decriminalization reforms91 have not been followed by a general increase in marijuana use, and 
recent data show a decline among young teens.92  An empirical examination of the effect of state 
marijuana legalizations taking effect in 2012 and 2014 (in Colorado, Washington, Alaska, and 
Oregon) finds no evidence of a significant impact on drug use, crime, traffic safety, teen 
educational achievement, or public health.93 
Business Conduct 
What about unfair or potentially harmful business conduct, such as price fixing or 
monopolization?  The Sherman Act authorizes courts to imprison violators for up to ten years.94  
In practice, antitrust enforcers pursue prison sentences only for price fixers, and convicted price 
fixers serve roughly two years in prison.95 
First, consider the case for punishment under the Classical and Neoclassical deterrence models.  
Under the Classical model, the purpose of punishment is to completely deter.  To completely 
deter the price fixer, the state would have to eliminate all of the profits from price fixing.  This 
would be an efficient policy if the price fixer’s conduct includes no economically efficient 
features.  Because of the possibility that it could, Becker recommended an approach that 
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internalizes the losses from price fixing.  Under Becker’s approach, price fixers should be 
completely deterred when and only when their conduct included no efficient features.96  It is 
important to note that the policy under consideration is to deter price fixing, not selling in 
general.  The previous example, which considered drug transactions, involved a policy to shutter 
an entire market. 
Although price fixing without any efficient features reduces society’s welfare, some price fixing 
may include efficient features.  For example, a group of firms might share an efficient 
technological process, but only if there is an agreement not to engage in fierce price cutting.  The 
decision to share the technology would enable differentiated firms to survive and continue to 
provide a variety of products to the market.  James Duke’s “Tobacco Trust” was formed in 
precisely this fashion: Duke used a technological innovation in cigarette production to force 
prices down, and then compelled rivals to join his cartel based on the same production model.97 
Given the possibility of efficient price fixing, and especially given that the broader crime of 
monopolization often includes efficient features (consider, for example, Microsoft’s 
technological integration of Internet Explorer with its operating system),98 the case in antitrust 
for criminal prohibition rather than internalization through private lawsuits is weak.  The default 
legal regime for antitrust to be placed under is the tort system, not the criminal justice system. 
Even in the likely majority case of inefficient price fixing, the case for criminal prohibition is 
weak.  The Classical model recommends complete deterrence of acts that harm victims, which 
are takings of a sort.  In the price fixing context, the purchaser is not harmed on net by the 
transaction. The purchaser gains on net from the transaction, but just not as much as he would 
have gained in a competitive market.  The reason price fixing is inefficient is not because of the 
component of harm suffered by purchasers – a component that is smaller than the purchaser’s 
gross gain – but because of the potential gain some potential consumers could have received had 
the price been set at the competitive level.  In other words, price fixing is inefficient or reduces 
social welfare, only because it denies some potential consumers a benefit that they would have 
received under a counterfactual hypothetical world of perfect competition.  We have no way of 
determining the identities of these denied beneficiaries.  The arguments here are illustrated in the 
diagram below, which shows the position of consumers and potential consumers (the individuals 
who would have purchased the good if the price had not been fixed above the competitive level, 
that is, fixed at PF rather than set at the competitive level PC).  The area labeled “net gain” 
shows the net welfare of the consumers, which is positive.  The area labeled “benefit denied” 
shows the forgone gain to potential consumers.  Since the activity of the price fixer does not 
impose a net harm on consumers, it should not be prohibited through the criminal laws.  The 
proper model is internalization of harm through private liability. 
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        Figure 2: Society’s welfare and price fixing 
 
The case for prohibiting price fixing is noticeably different from the reason we prohibit robbery.  
Robbery is undesirable because it clearly imposes a substantial net harm on the victim relative to 
the hypothetical world in which he was not robbed, and we have no trouble identifying the 
victim; we are considering the very same individual in both the real (robbed) and counterfactual 
(not robbed) scenarios.  In the price fixing case, no consumer suffers a net harm; that is, no 
consumer is in a worse off position than in the counterfactual in which he did not enter into the 
transaction.  Price fixing is prohibited only because of the potential gain denied to a class of 
unidentifiable potential consumers.  But to deny someone an unpromised gain is not the same 
thing as imposing a direct harm on him.  
One could argue that the consumer who purchases from the price fixer is in a worse off position 
relative to the counterfactual in which the price fixer lowers his price to the competitive level.  
By the same reasoning, one could argue that the consumer is in a worse off position relative to 
the counterfactual consumer who purchases at a price of zero.  However, the price will have to 
be set at a level that gives the seller a profit.  Mutually beneficial transactions will occur at any 
price level above the competitive level and the level representing the consumer’s maximum bid.  
To treat any consensual exchange that occurs at a price level above the competitive price as the 
equivalent of robbery is to ignore the difference between a consensual and nonconsensual 
transaction.  Hence an analogy between robbery and a transaction that occurs at a price above the 











One might argue that criminal law enforcement for price fixing is still appropriate because of the 
low probability of detection in antitrust.  But detection probabilities cannot, alone, provide a 
justification for applying the criminal law to an area of activity.  First, the tort system is capable 
of regulating conduct even when detection probabilities are low; a low detection probability can 
be used as a basis for increasing damages in the tort system, through the imposition of punitive 
damages, and thereby offsetting the deterrence dilution to the low detection probability.99  
Second, there are many scenarios in the tort system where detection probabilities are low, but we 
do not point to them as reasons for criminal law enforcement.  Most instances of defamation are 
probably never detected by victims.  But no one has argued that this is a reason to extend 
criminal law into the defamation area. 
As in the previous discussion of the criminalization of market activity, criminalization of 
business practices such as price fixing often entails the grant of substantial discretion to 
enforcers.  Price fixing may seem to be an easy offense to define, but it is not.  Antitrust law has 
had to grapple with whether the prohibition applies to horizontal price fixing alone, or whether it 
includes vertical price fixing too.100  The criminal provisions of the Sherman Act have never 
been applied to vertical price fixing in the U.S.  Still, cases have arisen where it is unclear 
whether the alleged price fixing should be characterized as horizontal or vertical.101  No-
poaching agreements among employers would seem to be clear instances of price fixing, but the 
Department of Justice only recently announced, after years of investigations, that it would 
consider prosecuting criminally in this area.102  
Because of the discretion enforcers have in the area of price fixing, there will inevitably be 
instances where enforcers treat similar cases unequally.  Take for example current Department of 
Justice activity on price fixing.  The Department has generated enormous fine payments by 
pursuing foreign firms for cartels in which they participated in the last two decades.103  At the 
same time, evidence has come to the Department that major domestic technology firms, such as 
Apple and Google, and other important domestic employers of software engineers, such as 
Disney and Pixar, have participated in “no poaching” agreements – that is, agreements not to hire 
                                                 
99 Hylton, supra note 18, at 460-61; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874-75 (1998).  
100 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-86 (2007) (holding that rule of reason 
analysis applies to vertical resale price maintenance agreements); Doctor Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co., 220 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1911) (finding vertical resale price maintenance agreements per se prohibited by the 
Sherman Act).   
101 United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 335 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding the district court’s finding that Apple’s 
conduct in establishing vertical agreements with ebook publishers constituted horizontal price fixing in violation of 
the Sherman Act). 
102 See Daniel G. Swanson, Jason Schwartz & Rod J. Stone, DOJ Crackdown on Employee Recruiting and 
Compensation, LAW360  (Dec. 5, 2016, 12:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/865254?sidebar=true.  
103 On recent international antitrust enforcement and financial penalties imposed on foreign firms, see Ankur Kapoor 
et al., Commentary: U.S. Criminal Antitrust Implicating Japanese at Alarming Rate, NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW (June 




employees away from one another.104  These no-poaching agreement investigations have been 
treated as civil antitrust cases, even though the activity is at bottom the same as price fixing.105 
From the public choice perspective, the disparate treatment of foreign price fixing cartels and 
domestic no-poaching agreements in the high technology sector would be easily explainable.  
The factors of enforcer discretion and high offender stakes are present in this area of 
enforcement,106 though probably to a lesser degree than in drug prohibition.   
These arguments suggest that in the area of price fixing, the role of criminal law enforcers should 
be more limited than it is today.  The presumption should be that this is an area of private 
enforcement through lawsuits, perhaps class actions brought on behalf of consumers or other 
victims of price fixing.  Public enforcement agencies may be able to offer a benefit to society in 
the detection sphere.  Public enforcement agencies can use the state’s resources to investigate 
whether a price fixing cartel exists. However, after the public enforcement agency has 
discovered information on the existence of a cartel, the remaining work should be left to private 
class action attorneys.  The state has no special advantage in determining the magnitude of the 
losses suffered by consumers, and criminal law has no special functional role to play in this area. 
Because of the loss to potential consumers (the benefit denied), damages to actual consumers 
would generally be insufficient to internalize the total social harms suffered as the result of price 
fixing.  There are several ways to remedy this problem.  One approach would permit the state to 
impose a fine approximating the deadweight loss resulting from the cartel.  Another approach 
would apply a multiplier to the compensatory damages award and permit the class action lawyers 
to take their compensation out of the amount awarded above the level required to fully 
compensate consumers.  In each of these approaches the fine revenue in excess of the amount 
needed to compensate could be used to reward public law enforcers, as long as their efforts have 
contributed to uncovering the cartel.  All of this is subject to the proviso that extraordinary 
methods of detection – such as phone tapping and invasions of property to search – should not be 
within the arsenal of investigatory methods used to discover evidence of price fixing.  
The Case against Prison 
The types of punishment identified within this framework vary from imprisonment, to monetary 
fines, to damages claims from victims, to public revelation.  In terms of effect on potential 
offenders, these punishments vary according to the individual.  Monetary fines or damages 
awards would have little effect on impecunious individuals, who would be unable to pay the fine 
or damages award.  Similarly, public revelation of criminal behavior would have little effect on 
individuals who are not concerned with their reputations.  Imprisonment is the most basic form 
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of punishment because it is capable of imposing a harm on every individual offender, whether 
impoverished or unconcerned about reputation.107 
Perhaps because of this basic nature of imprisonment, it has been viewed as the most severe of 
the punishments typically imposed.  However, the perceived severity of imprisonment, like the 
severity of monetary fines, depends on the characteristics of the convicted offender.  Among 
offenders who would experience a high opportunity cost from prison, incarceration would be 
viewed as a severe punishment, and probably more severe than being forced to pay a fine equal 
to the forgone wages from being excluded from the labor market during the time of 
imprisonment.  However, among offenders who would experience a low opportunity cost, 
imprisonment may not be viewed as a severe punishment. Of course, this statement assumes that 
imprisonment does not also include severe material deprivation or risk of harm.  If imprisonment 
also includes severe material deprivation, as it often does in underdeveloped countries, then even 
criminals whose opportunity cost of imprisonment is low would not view imprisonment as a mild 
punishment. 
Consider, for a moment, the view of an offender whose opportunity cost of imprisonment is low.  
For such an offender, the threat of imprisonment might not serve as a serious deterrent to 
unlawful conduct.  Some anecdotal evidence suggests that for offenders whose environments are 
already dangerous and chaotic, prison may provide an escape from relatively harsh conditions.108 
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There are numerous stories of prisoners boasting of their living conditions.  See, e.g., Admitted Serial Killer Says 
He’s Looking Forward to ‘Retirement’ in Prison, TRIBUNE MEDIA WIRE (Mar. 3, 2016, 1:41 PM), 
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If the offender is also committed to crime as an avocation, prison may offer the offender a 
chance to learn new skills that aid him in the future in committing crimes.109  For the foregoing 
reasons, imprisonment, far from being a deterrent, might appear to be an untroubling or even 
desirable option for some offenders. 
Viewing prison in general economic terms, imprisonment becomes less of a deterrent as the price 
of time in prison falls relative to the price of time outside of prison.  Once the relative price of 
prison time falls below unity, the threat of prison no longer deters.  The relative price of prison 
could fall to such a level because conditions in prison are not perceived as worse than conditions 
outside, or because prison is perceived as a place where a criminal can develop skills in criminal 
activity or promote himself within a criminal organization.110  Prisons offer economies of scale 
and scope, or more appropriately agglomeration externalities, that enhance investments in crime 
as an avocation.111 
One might respond that any offender for whom imprisonment seems desirable should be forced 
to experience some type of material deprivation along with imprisonment to make the prospect 
of imprisonment less desirable.  There are many difficulties with this proposed solution.  
Authorities would not know in advance how to distinguish offenders who prefer imprisonment 
from those who do not.  Fearing material deprivation, no prisoner would admit to having a 
preference for imprisonment, or even that he viewed imprisonment as a light punishment.  Such 
a policy might violate the constitutional constraint on cruel and unusual punishment, and would 
surely enhance the power of enforcement agents to demand bribes from offenders to avoid 
imprisonment.  Probably because of these factors, the only type of deprivation commonly 
observed today in the U.S. is solitary confinement.  But with the widespread dissemination of 
cheap forms of rapid communication by voice and video, solitary confinement is virtually 
impossible to administer today.  A recent television news report included a substantial video 
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111 Internally, many prisons today appear to serve as criminal enterprise hubs, where different criminal gangs 
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interview with a criminal serving a term in solitary confinement.112  From his solitary cell, the 
prisoner had managed a series of prison protests across the country, an endeavor that required 
nearly continuous communication with other prisoners in different prisons.113 
The argument advanced here – that prison is not necessarily a deterrent for every offender – 
should be distinguished from that presented in an article by Steven Levitt.114  He argued that the 
prospect of serving a prison term provided an effective constraint on the use of monetary fines.  
Any offender would know that he can always choose to refuse to pay the fine and serve a prison 
term instead.  Thus, any time the monetary fine rose above the offender’s assessment of the cost 
of imprisonment, he would choose imprisonment.  My argument here is different, because I am 
saying that imprisonment by itself is not necessarily a deterrent to some offenders.  For such 
offenders, imprisonment is equivalent to a fine of zero, or to a reward for commission of a crime. 
The existence of potential criminals who do not view imprisonment as a deterrent requires a 
different view of punishment for such offenders.  For the violent, or for the ones who would 
impose great harm on others, the incapacitation function becomes the sole justification for 
imprisonment.  Such offenders cannot be deterred by ordinary imprisonment, so the only rational 
basis for imprisoning them is to prevent them from harming others.  The category of offenders 
who would be likely to harm others in the future presumptively includes those who have already 
committed offenses that have harmed others – murder, rape, robbery, etc.115   
For offenders who are both unlikely to be deterred by prison and unlikely to impose harm on 
others, the utilitarian basis for imprisonment is nonexistent.  Such offenders should not be 
imprisoned.  It might seem plausible to assume at first that few offenders would fall in this 
category, but that assumption would be unwarranted.  Among the population of female prisoners, 
for example, there are many, probably the majority, who pose no substantial risk to others and 
for whom imprisonment has not proven itself a substantial deterrent.  These offenders should be 
released from the prisons and put under some other form of regulation, such as probation.  
Among the population of drug offenders, both male and female, there are many who pose no 
substantial risk to others and for whom imprisonment is not a substantial deterrent.  Since the 
criminal law should not control drug transactions generally, imprisonment would also be 
inappropriate for the nonviolent (or non-dangerous) drug offenders for whom imprisonment is a 
substantial deterrent. 
What about offenders who would pay a significant amount to avoid prison?  For the ones who 
are unlikely to harm others, the utilitarian case for imprisonment is weak.  Consider, for 
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example, a business executive who participated in a price fixing cartel.  The motivation for 
participation was solely financial, and given this, a penalty that completely eliminates any 
financial gain should eliminate the incentive to engage in such conduct,116 and at the same time 
provide a fund for compensating victims.   
These arguments suggest that among offenders who are unlikely to harm others, the state should 
try to determine whether prison would really serve as a deterrent, and whether alternative forms 
of discipline such as probation, rehabilitation programs, or monetary fines, can serve equally 
well as deterrents.  Prison should not be used for non-harmful offenders unless it serves as a 
significantly more effective deterrent than less costly alternatives. 
The foregoing arguments are all consistent with the Classical and Neoclassical models of law 
enforcement.  If prison is not an effective deterrent – say because it provides nothing more than a 
safe resting period between bouts of criminal activity outside of prison – then it should not be 
used as a punishment unless it serves a socially valuable incapacitative role.  From the 
perspective of the Classical model, the central question is whether prison sentences eliminate the 
gain from criminal activity.  If prison fails to “take the profit out of crime,” which appears to be 
true in many cases, then it clearly fails the most basic aim of a punishment system.  Moreover, if 
prisons serve as schools for the development of skills in areas of criminal conduct (e.g., burglary, 
robbery),117 then not only does the prison system fail to eliminate the gain to some criminal 
offenders, but it ensures that they will return to the same activity with more harmful potential in 
the future. 
The Neoclassical model emphasizes the tradeoff between deterrence and the cost of law 
enforcement (including punishment), and implies that prison should not be used when less costly 
and equally effective alternatives are available.  Prison is expensive: the average cost of holding 
a prisoner in the U.S. was $31,286 in 2010, with a maximum of over $60,000 in New York 
State.118  In addition, most prisoners would be able to contribute to the economy by working, so 
the loss of their contributions to the workforce, and to the household, should be included in the 
cost of imprisonment.  The resources wasted by the prison system could be better used in many 
other areas, such as education or health care. 
Public Choice and Prison 
The public choice model provides an additional set of reasons for limiting the use of prisons.  
The prison system in the U.S. has created an industry that argues in favor of its maintenance and 
expansion.  Public sector prison guards and private sector prisons have a strong interest in laws 
that impose imprisonment as punishment for violation.119  These groups lobby behind the scenes 
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for expanded imprisonment and fund politicians who promise to increase prison sentences or to 
use prison more widely as punishment. 
Because of the political power of public sector unions, any proposal to expand the use of 
imprisonment should be viewed with some degree of suspicion.  Politicians depend on public 
sector unions for fundraising and for votes.  Prisoners, on the other hand, do not present an 
effective voting or fundraising faction in opposition to the public sector unions.  The general 
taxpaying public, which has no reason to closely monitor the connection between politicians’ 
spending on prisons and support from public sector unions, also generally fails to provide a 
voting bloc in opposition to public sector prison-employee unions.  The classic public choice 
failure observed by Mancur Olson emerges: a concentrated interest group gains excessive control 
over the public’s use of resources.120  As a result, prison use is expanded, and prison sentences 
extended, beyond the level appropriate for punishment. 
Some evidence for the public choice model is suggested by the data on incarceration.  As crime 
rates have fallen in the U.S. and in other countries, prison use has not fallen with them.121 This is 
because as the crime rate has fallen, legislators have at the same time lengthened sentences for 
less serious crimes and extended incarceration to a wider set of offenses.  Of course, one could 
argue that this is at best incomplete evidence in favor of the public choice explanation because 
longer sentences should both increase the prison population and reduce the crime rate.  The 
evidence of declining crime coupled with more extensive use of prisons could be attributed 
largely to the deterrent effect of prison sentences.  To distinguish the public choice and 
deterrence accounts, one would have to identify specific types of prison expansion that could not 
be attributed to the deterrence function.   
Probably the best evidence favoring the public choice model is the dramatic explosion since the 
1980s in the number of women incarcerated.  At present, the U.S. incarcerates women at a far 
greater frequency than other developed countries.122  Thailand and El Salvador are close,123 but 
El Salvador’s high female incarceration rate is due to the country’s unusual policy of 
imprisoning women who get abortions.124  Thailand’s rate is close to the U.S., and it is due 
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almost entirely to severe sentences given to women who sell drugs in an effort to escape 
poverty.125   
The explosion in the number of incarcerated women in the U.S. is shown in Figure 3.  The 
women’s incarceration rate grew dramatically over the 1980s and 1990s.  The increase, from 
roughly 20 per 100,000 in 1980 to almost 140 per 100,000 in the mid-2000s, represents a scaling 
up by a factor of six in the incarceration rate of women over the last thirty years.  The total 
population of women incarcerated has increased from 26,378 in 1980 to 215,332 in 2014, an 
increase of more than 700 percent.126  These increases have resulted not because women have 
become more violent or criminalistic since the 1980s, but mostly because of drug laws that 
ensnare them, often for not much more than being associated with men who deal drugs.127 
 
 
Figure 3: Women’s Incarceration Rate in the United States                                                                                                                                
Source: https://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/women_rate_1910-2014.html 
 
The massive increase in the number of incarcerated women in the U.S. imposes an enormous tax 
on society’s welfare.  Incarceration serves no substantial deterrence function in these cases 
because the women often are punished for being involved with men who violated the law.  The 
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great majority (over sixty percent) of them are incarcerated for nonviolent crimes,128 and of the 
women convicted of violent crimes, the vast majority are for simple assaults, mostly against 
other women with whom they have had some prior relationship.129  Mass imprisonment of 
women is especially harmful to society because the incarcerated women are prevented not only 
from working in the formal job sector, as is true of incarcerated men, but also from working 
informally by providing support to children.130  
Although this is only a preliminary look at the data, they suggest that the typical picture one has 
of a criminal – someone who leaps from the bushes to violently assault a law-abiding stranger – 
describes almost none of the women currently serving time in jail or prison in the U.S.  The vast 
majority are incarcerated because of nonviolent crimes, or violence related to domestic or 
relation-based disputes.  These sorts of violent crimes are unlikely ever to be substantially 
deterred through punishment; they often result from “heat of passion” moments when offenders 
are not thinking rationally about the consequences of their actions.  The crime that has generally 
concerned the public, by contrast, is the sort that involves rational predatory conduct: holding 
people up for money, or rape; and since the conduct is rational, it appears capable of being 
deterred through punishment.  This sort of rational predatory crime appears to be the exclusive 
preserve of men.  The upshot is that the vast majority of women convicted of crimes could be 
given much milder prison sentences, or assigned to out-of-prison rehabilitation programs, 
without substantially effecting the deterrence of crime.  That we have instead observed nearly 
exponential growth in the number of incarcerated women over the last four decades lends 
support to the public choice perspective on imprisonment. 
Should Penalties Be Used to Finance Enforcement? 
One of the most controversial features of the criminal justice system today is the use of fines to 
finance the criminal justice system.  The U.S. Justice Department study of Ferguson, Missouri 
concluded that the local police force had used fines excessively in an effort to maximize 
revenues for the police department and local courts.131 The result of this system, according to the 
Justice Department, was that a largely white police force had used the law enforcement process 
as a means of transferring resources from a largely black local population to local police and 
courts.132  But this is not the only example of alleged “policing for profit.”133  Civil forfeiture 
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statutes have given local police forces incentives to aggressively take property from individuals 
charged with violating the law.134 
How should such activities be viewed within this framework?  The Neoclassical model offers a 
ready defense for using fines to fund law enforcement.  In Becker’s analysis, the ideal 
punishment compels the offender to bear the entire incremental harm suffered by society as a 
result of his conduct, which means that the offender should pay for the harm suffered by the 
victim and also the incremental enforcement costs borne by the state.135  The reason is that 
enforcement costs are triggered by the offender’s conduct.  If enforcement naturally follows 
criminal actions, then the cost of enforcement is simply just another cost generated by criminal 
conduct.   
It is important to note that the Becker model treats the enforcement decision as a mechanical or 
automatic one following any criminal act. If enforcement is not such a mechanical decision – for 
example, if it is carried out by an agent only after weighing the consequences of enforcement – 
then the mechanical assumption of the Becker model would be inappropriate.  In this alternative 
view, it might be socially preferable to encourage the enforcement agent to take no action where 
the cost of enforcement far exceeds any potential gain in terms of deterrence.136   
This suggests one important potential limitation to the utilitarian justification for using criminal 
fines to finance enforcement.  If the social value of the deterrence brought about by law 
enforcement is so small that the optimal decision is not to enforce the law, then forcing offenders 
to pay for the costs of enforcement activity would merely subsidize and further encourage 
wasteful law enforcement.  An ideal system would cancel the subsidy. 
The first reform proposal suggested by this model, then, is that the use of fines for financing 
criminal law enforcement should be limited to areas where the social value of deterrence through 
enforcement is substantial.  Where the deterrence value of enforcement is questionable or 
minimal, fines should not be collected to finance enforcement activity. 
What sorts of law enforcement would fall in the questionable or minimal value category?  I have 
suggested several goods or service markets currently criminalized (e.g., marijuana, prostitution) 
from which criminal law should be ousted.  In its place there should be some tax or liability 
system.  This implies that criminal law enforcement has relatively low value as a deterrent in 
these areas.  Thus, fines imposed for the purpose of financing the criminal justice system should 
not be permitted for offenses such as marijuana possession.   
For offenses where there is a high deterrent value to enforcement, such as robbery, fines assessed 
to finance enforcement seem to be justifiable under the Becker model.  They bring home to the 
criminal the full cost of his conduct. The goal of punishment in the area of common law crimes 
should be to completely deter the conduct by wiping out any gain to the offender.  But this goal 
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merely establishes the floor for punishment.  Nothing in the framework suggests that it would be 
inappropriate to enhance penalties to help fund the criminal justice system. 
I have so far not considered the public choice perspective on using fines to finance enforcement.  
The public choice model indicates a second important limitation on the use of fines to finance the 
criminal justice system.  Such fines tend to distort the actions of enforcement agents.  Some 
enforcers may choose to target offenders to maximize fine revenue.  Moreover, the use of fines 
as a revenue tool immediately generates questions of fairness in application.  A police officer 
probably would not choose to use fines in a patently profit-maximizing manner against members 
of his own community.  The risk of a discriminatory enforcement strategy is enhanced when 
fines are used in part as a source of revenue for enforcers. 
Even judges might be affected by the use of fines as a source of revenue for the criminal justice 
system.  If the fines are used in part to finance the courts as well as the police,137 judges might 
consider the source of their support when examining a case that pits the word of a police officer 
against the word of an alleged offender.  A judge might be inclined to lean in favor of the police 
officer, realizing that the cost of constraining a police officer’s freedom to impose fines might be 
a reduction in the quality of the judge’s own work environment or in the monetary resources 
available for judicial pay increases. 
The public choice concerns raised so far do not require any theory of discriminatory intent to be 
viewed as potentially serious.  Even if the police force and the judiciary are racially homogenous 
and of the same race as the local population, the use of fines as a revenue source could generate 
biases in enforcement and judging because of the pecuniary interest of officials within the 
criminal justice system.  Introducing a substantial difference between the racial composition of 
the officers in the criminal justice system and the racial composition of the local population 
amplifies the risk of incentive biasing.  If the officers are of one race and the local population is 
of another race, the officers may not live among and communicate frequently with members of 
the local population.138  As a result, the officers may become relatively immune to the 
enforcement burdens perceived by local residents. 
To blunt the incentives for discriminatory enforcement, fines collected to fund enforcement or 
justice system costs should be allocated to uses that do not immediately benefit enforcement 
agents and local judges.  Criminal justice system officers should understand that the revenue 
from fines will be used to fund programs that are unrelated to their pecuniary interests, or 
possibly hostile to their interests.  Money being fungible, it would not be a solution to the 
                                                 
137 Justice in Louisiana: The Ruin of Many a Poor Boy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21694525-crisis-louisianas-courts-emblematic-broader-pathologies-
both-state-and (“Not just public defenders but Louisiana’s sheriffs and prosecutors, and the courts themselves, 
subsist partly on fees, fines and bonds imposed largely at judges’ discretion, mostly on defendants who plead or are 
found guilty.”).  
138 Given residential segregation patterns in the U.S., the officers would be unlikely to live among the local 
population.  See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1998) (exploring residential segregation in the U.S. and its implications for 
crime and other social ills).  
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conflict of interest problem for the fine revenue to be used to pay for anything that might 
immediately reduce the expenses of the police force. 
One simple solution would be to dedicate such revenue to funding criminal defense lawyers, or 
to job training and other educational programs for prisoners.  Under such an allocation, no 
enforcement agent would impose fines with the intention of enriching himself or improving his 
own working conditions.  If the fine revenue were used to support criminal defense lawyers, 
every criminal justice system official would know that when he imposes a fine, he is enhancing 
the likelihood that some offender, if not the one before him, would be able to have the charges 
against him examined in an adversarial process in court.  If the fine revenue were used to support 
educational or job training in prison, every criminal justice system official would know that 
when he imposes a fine, he is enhancing the likelihood that some offender would exit the 
criminal justice system and become a productive member of society.139 
The fine revenue used to fund criminal defense need not be directed toward a state public 
defender’s office as part of this reform.  Indeed, there are reasons to question a general policy of 
using fine revenue to support a state agency of public defenders.  For example, if a defendant is 
charged a fine for showing up late to court, sending the revenue from the fine to the public 
defender’s office might harmfully distort the incentives of employees in the public defender’s 
office.  Some of the employees might realize that arriving late to court is a method of increasing 
the resources of the office.  Public defenders have been criticized in the past for having weak 
incentives to zealously represent criminal defendants.140  If fine revenue were directed toward 
the public defender’s office, the weak incentives supposedly present already might be weakened 
further. 
To avoid setting up perverse incentives for public defenders, the fine revenue should be made 
available to the public defender only if it cannot be attributed to some fault on the part of the 
public defender (such as negligently allowing his client to skip a hearing).  An alternative would 
be to use the fine revenue to fund “legal defense vouchers” that would permit criminal 
defendants to pay for private lawyers.  Private lawyers would have ordinary market-based 
incentives to develop reputations for excellent service.  A voucher system would enhance 
incentives on the part of criminal defense lawyers to develop reputations as effective legal 
representatives of non-wealthy criminal defendants. 
The problem of discriminatory enforcement incentives and monetary penalties is not limited to 
the regulation of street crime.  Antitrust has generated a different version of the discriminatory 
enforcement problem.  As noted earlier, the Department of Justice has taken in an increasing 
                                                 
139  See, e.g., Cathryn A. Chappell, Post-Secondary Correctional Education and Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis of 
Research Conducted 1990-1999, 55 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 148, 162 (2004); James S. Vacca, Educated Prisoners 
are Less Likely to Return to Prison, 55 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 297, 297-99 (2004). 
140 See, e.g., EMILY WEST, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS 
IN POST‐CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA EXONERATION CASES 1 (2010),  
http://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Innocence_Project_IAC_Report.pdf (providing an 
empirical analysis supporting the claim that the lack of national standards for creating and funding public defender 
systems has left most states with underfunded systems, leading to overburdened and sometimes incompetent defense 
lawyers, and a lack of funding for the investigative process). 
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amount of revenue from antitrust fines,141 mostly imposed on foreign (specifically Asian) firms 
lately.142 At the same time, fines and prison sentences imposed on domestic firms for entering 
into “no-poaching agreements,” a form of market division, have been relatively light.  These 
patterns have generated suggestions that antitrust enforcement is either discriminatory or 
deliberately structured in a manner that has had a discriminatory impact.143  Responding to these 
suggestions, John M. Connor published an empirical evaluation in which he concludes that the 
evidence suggests that Asian antitrust violators have received weaker punishments on average 
than their European and American counterparts.144  However, Connor’s own data  offer some 
support to the discrimination hypothesis.  While the ratio of fines on American to Asian price 
fixers is roughly 5 to 1 in his data,145 the ratio of commerce associated with these parties is 
roughly 13 to 1,146 suggesting discrimination against Asian violators if comparing penalties per 
dollar of commerce affected by the cartel. 
Clearly a careful study of the discrimination hypothesis in antitrust enforcement is warranted.  
However, whatever the results of such a study would show, the point remains that the lure of fine 
revenue can distort enforcement incentives, and the distortion is likely to disfavor “out-group” 
potential offenders.  This is the pattern preliminarily suggested by the Justice Department’s 
report on Ferguson and also by the data on international antitrust enforcement. 
The antitrust penalties collected by the Justice Department, unlike those discussed in the Justice 
Department’s Ferguson Report, are not used to finance enforcement.  The Antitrust Division of 
the Justice Department has a budget of roughly $165 million.147  The annual fine revenue in the 
Antitrust Division in the year 2015 was roughly $3.6 billion.148  The Antitrust Division is not an 
example of a cash-strapped enforcement agency seeking to fill holes in its budget through fines 
collected from low-level offenders.  This suggests that the distortionary effects of fines are likely 
to be much less severe in the antitrust context.  Still, the potential distortionary effect suggests a 
reason, aside from international comity issues, for limiting the reach of antitrust laws with 
respect to foreign conduct.   
These issues in antitrust were at the heart of a dispute pitting, briefly, Judge Posner against the 
Department of Justice over the Department’s power to enforce the Sherman Act against foreign 
cartels.  In Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics,149 Posner had initially read the relevant statute, 
the Foreign Trade and Antitrust Improvement Act, in a manner that severely constrained the 
                                                 
141 For statistics on antitrust fine revenue, see Criminal Enforcement Trends Charts, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, 
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power of private victims and enforcement agents to use the Sherman Act against foreign cartels 
that had only an indirect effect on American commerce.  Posner’s initial Motorola Mobility 
opinion was vacated and in a later opinion Posner recognized a distinction between private 
parties and government enforcers giving the government broader power to sue foreign cartels 
with only an indirect effect.150   Posner never discussed the public choice issues.  His reason for 
granting greater power to the Department of Justice than to a private plaintiff is the theory that 
the Department would take comity issues into account while a private plaintiff would not.  
Unmentioned in his opinion is the greater likelihood that private suits would not be tainted by 
discriminatory incentives, since plaintiffs are seeking as much as possible in monetary damages 
and are therefore unlikely to shy away from suing any particular set of defendants, whether 
domestic or foreign.  Such neutrality should be viewed as an important component of law 
enforcement.  
Conclusion 
Rational deterrence theory has been viewed with some skepticism in criminal law scholarship for 
its failure to recognize the degree to which criminals are motivated by irrational impulses, and 
this skepticism leads naturally to a view that rehabilitation and incapacitation are more important 
goals than deterrence.151  In this paper I have adhered to the rational deterrence model, setting it 
out with a bit more detail than usual and joining it with public choice theory.  The framework 
leads to the conclusions that the scope of criminal law is far too broad today, the use of 
imprisonment excessive, and the levying of fines to finance enforcement in need of regulatory 
guidelines.  However, this is not because offenders are not fully rational, or not fully capable of 
learning the rules and bringing them to bear on their own conduct.  These conclusions follow 





                                                 
150 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2014). 
151 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5. 
